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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is in a civil case from a ruling of the Second Judicial District Court,

Weber County, the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor presiding. The Utah Supreme Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (2003).
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Was Larry Faulkner's Renunciation valid to disclaim his interest

in the Trust Property?
This issue was preserved at R. 602-04 and 822-28.
Standard of Review: Whether a renunciation or disclaimer is effective is a
question of fact. In re Rohn 's Estate, 175 N.W.2d 419 (Iowa 1970) (the effectiveness of
a renunciation is a question of fact); 96 C.J.S., Wills, §1714 (whether a disclaimer is
sufficient is a question of fact). Whether a beneficiary has accepted property is a question
of fact. In re O'Byrnes Will, 142 N.Y.S.2d 458, 459 (Sur. Ct. 1955). Whether an
acceptance of property sought to be disclaimed bars the disclaimer under Utah Code is a
mixed question of fact and law. In this case the Trial Court made a factual determination
that Mr. Faulkner had accepted trust property. The Trial Court then needed to determine
whether the acceptance of Trust property barred Mr. Faulkner's attempted disclaimer
under Utah Code Annotated §75-2-801. The Trial Court applied U.C.A. §75-2-801 to the
facts of this case and determined that Mr. Faulkner's acceptance of some trust property
barred his disclaimer. According to State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-40 (Utah 1994),
when a trial court is asked to determine "whether a given set of facts comes within the
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reach of a given rule of law" the trial court is given a de facto grant of discretion. Until
an appellate court has determined that a particular fact situation does or does not satisfy
the legal standard at issue, the trial court has discretion to venture into that area and make
the determination. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939-40 n.5. (Utah 1994). A trial court's
application of law to the facts is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Platts v. Parents
Helping Parents dba Turnabout, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997).
Issue No. 2. Is Cross Appellant/Plaintiff David Whitney entitled to prejudgment interest on the amount in Garnishee's possession which was payable to
Plaintiff upon service of the writ of garnishment?
This issue was preserved at R. 860.
Standard of Review: Entitlement to prejudgment interest presents a question of
law, reviewed for correctness. Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 177
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995).
III.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

{

The issue of whether Mr. Faulkner's disclaimer is valid is governed by Utah Code
Annotated §75-2-801. (Utah's Disclaimer Statute). A full copy of the Code section is set

{

forth in the Appellee's Addendum attached herewith.
The issue of prejudgment interest is governed by Utah Code Annotated, §15-1-1,
I
which provides:

I
2
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(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the
subject of their contract.
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or
chose in action shall be 10% per annum.
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any
penalty or interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or
to any contract or obligations made before May 14, 1981.
Prejudgment intei est is also go\ ernedb> the follov dng [ Itah cases: Cornia v. Wilcox,
898 -

• " ^ 4'

*

:

lah 1995); Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.Zd I

(Utah Ct. App. 1993); Bjork v. April Industries, Inc., 560 V.2d 115 (Utah 1977), cert.
denied, 4^1 TT 9 °^0- L&A Drywall Inc \ Whitmore Constr : i. . ••

:V2d (hlh \ I llali

r
1980); Vasels
IV.

• .

•

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. ' Nature of f lie Lase and Course of the Proceedings
In 1^X6 111-" 1 inited Stales Dislniei C'ourl of Utah entered a fraud judgment against

Larry Faulkner and Roberta Beverly. The Judgment ¥v as domesticated and renewed in
1996 in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County in 1996. Renee Faulkner is
the \\'itc oi Lai i -} r'aulkner. In 1992, Jennie A. I "aulkne i the motl lei Df defendant I .any
Fai llkner, created a tn ist wl iicl I was amended in 1996 and 1997. Under the Trust and its
amendments, the Trust left specific bequests to Jennie's daughters and grandsons and left
the residuum of her estate to her son, Larry Faulkner and her daughter-in-law R enee
Faulkner. In the event that either Larry or Renee predeceased Jennie, I lie sui vi\ oi w.r, l- >
3
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succeed to the entire residue of the estate. The personal property of the estate was to be
divided among Jennie's three children.
Jennie A. Faulkner died on November 9, 2000. Renee Faulkner was appointed
successor trustee under the terms of the Trust. In November, 2000, shortly after Jennie
Faulkner's death, family members met to distribute the personal property. Larry Faulkner
took possession of several items of personal property from the Trust. He did not disclaim
any interest in the Trust at that time, nor did he manifest any intent to disclaim his interest
in the Trust at that time.
In approximately April 2002, Jennie Faulkner's home, in the name of the Trust,
was sold. After the proceeds of the Trust were distributed, David Whitney served a Writ
of Garnishment on Renee Faulkner, garnishing any property in her possession that
belonged to Larry Faulkner. Ms. Faulkner filed a motion to quash the writ of garnishment
and responded in the interrogatories to garnishee that she was not in possession of any
monies belonging to Larry Faulkner because he had renounced his interest in the estate
prior to the distribution of the residue of the Trust.
The Second District Court ultimately ruled that Mr. Faulkner's renunciation was
ineffective, and therefore, one-half of the distribution made to Renee Faulkner was
property subject to garnishment and payable to Whitney under the Writ of Garnishment.

*

The Second District Court signed a Garnishee Order requiring Ms. Faulkner to pay the
sum of $29,243.64 to Plaintiff. However, the Second District Court denied Plaintiffs
4
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<

request for pre-judgment interest in the final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Judgment and Garnishee Order entered May 9, 2002. Faulkner appealed the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Garnishee Order that required Faulkner
to pay to Whitney the sum of $29,243.64. This cross-appeal is taken from that portion of
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Garnishee Order that
denied pre-judgment interest.
B.

Statement of Facts

Plaintiffs have an outstanding unsatisfied judgment against Larry Faulkner and
Roberta Beverly. Larry Faulkner has not been formally employed since 1993. Mr.
Faulkner's mother, Jennie A. Faulkner, was his only source of income from 1993 until her
death in 2000. Mr. Faulkner has not had a bank account in at least five years. For the past
24 years, Larry Faulkner has lived at 3608 West 6000 South, Roy, Utah with his wife,
Renee Faulkner. Larry Faulkner does not own a car, but drives a 1995 Toyota 4-Runner
that belongs to Renee Faulkner. Larry Faulkner's gas money for the Toyota, at least in
the year 2001, has come from Renee Faulkner. Larry Faulkner's spending money in the
year 2001 also came from Renee Faulkner. Renee Faulkner pays the credit card bills for
the Visa credit card and the Chevron credit card that Larry Faulkner uses. Renee
Faulkner is Mr. Faulkner's only source of money. (R. 862-863).
On December 29, 1992, Jennie A. Faulkner, the mother of defendant Larry
Faulkner, created a trust called the Jennie A. Faulkner Trust. She transferred her house at
5
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1255 21st Street, Ogden, Utah (the "Home") into that trust. (R. 863). Jennie Faulkner
amended and restated the trust on January 18, 1996 and on July 18, 1997 (Trust and all
amendments herein referred to as the "Trust") (R.863). The Trust provided that upon
Jennie's death, $30,000.00 or 30% (whichever was less) of the Trust estate went to her
two daughters and grandsons, and the remaining 70% went to "Lawrence and Renee A.
Faulkner." In the event that either Lawrence or Renee predeceased Jennie, the survivor
was to succeed to the entire 70% interest in the Trust estate. (R.864). Pursuant to the
Trust, items of personal and household effects were to be distributed to individuals as set
forth in "Exhibit B" to the Trust. In the event that not all of the personal and household
items were disposed of by "Exhibit B," the personal and household items not listed on
"Exhibit B" were to go to Jennie A. Faulkner's children in approximate equal shares. (R.
863)
Jennie Faulkner died on November 9, 2000. Renee Faulkner was appointed
i

successor trustee under the terms of the Trust.

On November 18, 2000, Larry Faulkner

and other family members met at Jennie's home to distribute the personal property. Some
of the personal property of the Trust was located at Jennie's home, and the remainder of

{

the personal property was located at the home of Renee and Larry Faulkner. The property
located at Jennie's Home was distributed at the November 18th meeting to the three
children, Glenda, Larry, and Marilyn or their representatives, and Glenda, Larry and
Marilyn took possession of the property (R. 864-5).
i
6
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On November 19, 2000, there was a meeting at Renee and Larry Faulkner's house.
The purpose of this meeting was to distribute the personal property which was referred to
on "Exhibit B" to the Trust, which had not been distributed at the meeting the day before.
Present at the November 19, 2000 meeting were Renee Faulkner, Larry Faulkner, Christie
Zabriski, and Glenda Burnside. "Exhibit B" to the Trust provided that certain people,
including Renee and Larry Faulkner would receive specific items of property from the
Trust. On November 19, 2000, the items from "Exhibit B" to the Trust were distributed.
Larry Faulkner personally took possession of several items of personal property from the
Trust, including the "Exhibit B" items, television and TV stand, mattress, towels, camera,
binoculars, yard tools, clock, wood mirrors, various pictures, crystal nut dishes,
tablecloths, kiln, various figurines and knickknacks, hide-a-bed, Christmas lights, vacuum
cleaner, patio swing, bed, and mirror. Larry Faulkner also received Jennie A. Faulkner's
opal ring. (R. 865-6).
On approximately January 14, 2001, Trustee Renee Faulkner prepared an
inventory of the Jennie Faulkner Estate and an accounting of the distributions made from
the Trust (hereinafter referred to as "List of Distributions"). The List of Distributions
was prepared to demonstrate how the personal property of the Jennie A. Faulkner Trust
had been distributed. The List of Distributions indicates that specific items of personal
property, as listed above, were distributed to Larry Faulkner. (R. 866).

7
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The home of Jennie A. Faulkner (owned by the Trust) was sold in April 2001, and
the proceeds of sale were delivered to Renee Faulkner as Trustee on May 1, 2001. The
net proceeds of the sale of the home were $84,635.05, and there was an additional
$1,820.58 cash from a Trust bank account which was held by the Trustee. The total cash
in the Trust estate was $86,455.63 as of May 2, 2001. (R. 866-7).
On May 2, 2001, Orders in Supplemental Proceedings were issued against Roberta
Beverly and Larry Faulkner. On May 4, 2001, Roberta Beverly was served with an Order
in Supplemental Proceedings in this case which ordered her to not dispose of any of her
assets pending the hearing. On May 4, 2001, Renee Faulkner as Trustee directed her
attorney, Brad Smith, to distribute the cash assets from the Trust to the beneficiaries as
follows: Glenda Burnside: $10,000.00; Marilyn Clements: $5,000.00; Benjamin
Faulkner: $8,645.56; Christopher Faulkner: $4,322.78; and Renee Faulkner:
$58,487.29. (R. 867).
On May 10, 2001, an Order in Supplemental Proceedings was served on Larry
Faulkner, and a Writ of Garnishment was served on Renee Faulkner in her individual
capacity as garnishee. The Order in Supplemental Proceedings served on Larry Faulkner
on May 10, 2001, restrained Mr. Faulkner from assigning or disposing of any of his assets
prior to the Supplemental Proceedings Order hearing. The Writ of Garnishment served
on Renee Faulkner, as Garnishee, attached any monies in her possession which belonged
to Larry Faulkner, and directed that she pay such funds to Plaintiff or the Court.
8
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At the time Renee Faulkner was served with her Writ of Garnishment, she had received
her alleged distribution of $58,487.29 from the Trust and had deposited it into her
personal bank account. (R. 867-8).
On May 4, 2001, Larry Faulkner executed a document entitled "Renunciation of
Interest." In the Renunciation of Interest executed by Larry Faulkner, the recitals of the
Renunciation of Interest state that Mr. Faulkner "desires to renounce and relinquish all
right, title, interest, or claim as a beneficiary of the Estate or Trust of Jennie A. Faulkner
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-801." The operative provisions of the Renunciation,
however, state, "Now, therefore, in consideration of the foregoing, and pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 75-2-801,1, Larry C. Faulkner, hereby renounce, relinquish and otherwise
forfeit all my right, title, interest, or claim as a beneficiary of the Estate of Jennie A.
Faulkner as though I had predeceased her." (R. 868).
The Renunciation of Interest was filed in the Second District Court under Civil
No. 013900149, on May 4, 2001. Prior to May 4, 2001, the date that the Renunciation of
Interest was executed and filed with the court, Larry Faulkner had taken possession of
items of personal property from the Jennie A. Faulkner Trust, including the items listed
on the List of Distributions, the "Exhibit B" items, and the opal ring. Larry Faulkner did
not disclaim or attempt to disclaim his interest in the Jennie A. Faulkner Estate or Trust
prior to May 4, 2001. (R. 868).

9
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After hearing on the matter, the trial court determined that Larry Faulkner's
disclaimer was ineffective and barred by his acceptance of Trust property prior to his
attempted disclaimer. (R. 869). The Court determined that while U.C.A. §75-2-801(1)
allows partial or fractional disclaimers, Mr. Faulkner's disclaimer was clearly not a
disclaimer of a partial or fractional interest. (R. 869). Rather, Mr. Faulkner attempted to
disclaim his entire interest in the Estate of Jennie A. Faulkner, and thus his acceptance of
property he sought to disclaim barred his disclaimer. (R. 869). The Trial Court
alternatively determined that Mr. Faulkner had received and taken a benefit from the
Trust by virtue of the fact that Trust property was in his home and subject to his use and
enjoyment. (R. 864). The Trial Court determined that Mr. Faulkner's receipt of benefits
from the Trust also barred and invalidated his disclaimer of the Trust property. (R. 870).
The Court determined that at the time the Writ of Garnishment was served upon
Renee Faulkner, she was in possession of $29,243.64, which rightfully belonged to Larry
Faulkner as a beneficiary of the Trust of Jennie A. Faulkner. The Court ordered Ms.
Faulkner to pay $29,243.64 plus costs to Whitney. (R. 870-1).
V.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Larry Faulkner's disclaimer was ineffective on its face to disclaim property in the

Trust because the language of the disclaimer only disclaimed Faulkner's interest as a
beneficiary of the Estate of Jennie Faulkner, not his interest as a beneficiary of the Trust
of Jennie A. Faulkner. Because the property in Renee Faulkner's possession at the time
10
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the Writ of Garnishment was served was the residuum of the Trust, Larry Faulkner's
Renunciation was invalid to disclaim that interest.
Furthermore, Larry Faulkner's general disclaimer was an invalid disclaimer and
was barred under Utah Code Annotated §75-2-801(5) by his acceptance of property and
benefits from the Trust prior to his execution of the disclaimer. The Trial Court
determined that Larry Faulkner took property and benefits from the Trust prior to
executing his disclaimer. Whether Faulkner accepted property is a question of fact
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. However, in this case, Faulkner failed to
marshal the evidence in support of the Trial Court's factual finding, and is, thus, barred
from raising that issue here.
The issue of whether the acceptance of Trust property bars the disclaimer filed by
Faulkner in its entirety is a mixed question of fact and law that required the Trial Court to
apply Utah Code §75-2-801 to the facts of this case. Because the appellate courts in Utah
have not addressed this issue, the Trial Court should be granted de facto discretion to
make such determination. Regardless, however, of whether the issue is reviewed under
an abuse of discretion or correction of error standard, the Trial Court did not err in
making that determination.
Utah Code requires that disclaimers describe the interest or the property being
disclaimed, and that the disclaimant declare the extent of the disclaimer. U.C.A. §75-2801(3)(a) and (b). Faulkner's disclaimer described all his interest in the Estate of Jennie
11
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Faulkner, which was barred by his acceptance of Trust property covered by the
disclaimer. Furthermore, while Larry Faulkner could have executed a partial or fractional
disclaimer, he failed to do so. The Trial Court determined that Faulkner's general
disclaimer was barred by Utah Code Section 75-2-801 by his acceptance of Trust
property, and that the language of the disclaimer was not a partial or fractional disclaimer.
The Trial Court's decision should be affirmed.
Finally, the Trial Court erred in failing to assess prejudgment interest on the
amount subject to the Garnishment Order. Prejudgment interest is appropriate under Utah
law where the damages are complete, the loss can be measured by facts and figures, and
the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time. The garnishment amount meets
each of these tests. When the Writ of Garnishment was served on May 10,2001, Renee
Faulkner had in her possession $29,243.64 that properly belonged to Larry Faulkner.
Although Ms. Faulkner took the position that such money belonged to her by virtue of
Larry Faulkner's disclaimer, the Trial Court disagreed and determined that the $29,243.64
should have been paid to Whitney pursuant to the Writ of Garnishment, the same as if
Renee Faulkner had properly answered the interrogatories. Thus as of May 10, 2001,
Renee Faulkner had $29,243.64 that should have been paid to Faulkner. Whitney, who
stood in the shoes of Faulkner pursuant to the Writ of Garnishment, was entitled to have
that money paid. When Renee Faulkner failed to pay the money, the damages were fixed
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as of a certain date, and prejudgment interest was appropriate under Utah Code Ann, §151-"! The Trial Court's decision on prejudgment interest shoLL. iv : e \ . r^ou
VI.

ARGUMENT
Utah's disclaimer statute, §75-2-801 does not address the use of disclaimers to

avoid valid judgment creditors. "N or, is there an> rele\ ant conti oiling case la/\ v In I Jtah :)i i
tins issue, Then1 has always been a common law right that a beneficiary can disclaim an
interest. This is based on the premise that the law will not impose unwanted gifts on
beneficiaries. 96 CIS,,

Wills §1708, citing Essen v. GUmorc\(v> \

200i'K While, ilie states are divided oi i vv hethei abenefi ..;
del

•

>{ * •

.

-K

^ . a s.

:-, . i::->. . . .*

i:s, the majority of states permit a disclaimer to prevent the

disclaimant's creditors from reaching the disclaimed property. Trev.

Trew, ^ "^ X v ' ~\-

314 (Neb. 19961 rev \l on other grounds 567 N.W.2d 284 (Neb. 1997); see also Tomkins
State Bank v. Miles, 53 7 N.E.2d 2" 74 (111. 1989).
The Internal Revenue :^ei\ i^e na> Mgnmcant experience in tic.jnmm;

r

-..

Aiilmliix of disclaimer ami they require strict Muiipham r uiih "<faUihi»i \ and u*<>ula1on
requirements to effectuate a valid disclaimer. 26 U.S.C §2518(b) and 26 C.F.R.
§25.2518-2(a). Because the IRS has had significant experience in construing the validity
and effectiveness of disclaimers, their treatment ;•; i.i*i

MK >> m-iructive.

In this case, Whitney is not asking in. '. . --,irl to apply form over substance in
consulting the siatute, Ralliei; Wlntncy

,M-^.;

:

^- Cnuil lo liuik carelalh al Ihi; lartiiiULic

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the disclaimer, to determine whether under the terms of the statute Faulkner's
disclaimer was barred. This is consistent with the Courts' approach as shown below, and
is not in violation of Utah Code Ann.§68-3-2,1 as suggested by Faulkner.
A.

FAULKNER'S RENUNCIATION OF HIS INTEREST IN THE
TRUST WAS INEFFECTIVE AND STATUTORILY BARRED.
1.

On Its Face, The Renunciation Was Ineffective to Disclaim
Faulkner's Interest in the Trust.

Because the Trial Court properly determined that Faulkner's disclaimer was
statutorily barred by his acceptance of Trust property, the Trial Court did not rule whether
Faulkner's disclaimer was valid to disclaim Faulkner's interest in the Trust.2 However,
the disclaimer executed by Mr. Faulkner was ineffective on its face. Utah Code
Annotated §75-2-801 addresses disclaimers in Utah, and provides that "a person . . . to
whom an interest in or with respect to property or an interest therein devolves .. . may
disclaim it in whole or in party by delivering or filing a written disclaimer under this
section." U.C.A.§75-2-801(l) (2003). The disclaimer must be delivered or filed not
later than nine months after the effective date of the nontestamentary instrument.
U.C.A.§75-2-801(2)(b). The disclaimer, or a copy thereof, must be delivered in person or

^.C.A. §68-3-2 provides that all statutes shall be liberally construed, even when in
derogation of the common law.
2

This issue was raised below at R. 822-25.
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mailed by certified mail to the person who has legal title to, or possession of the interest
disclaimed Id. Utah Code IJ.C.A..§75-2-801(3) provides that:
(3) The disclaimer shall:
(a) describe the property or interest disclaimed;
11 • declare the disclaimer and extent thereof; and
( - • sigi led b> the disdain lant.
Ill i* undi filled Ihal I ;iii\ Faulkm r is ;i nnninl tvnefinan ul'lli • Tmsl M\\\ illim! i
Jennie Faulkner's son, Larry Faulkner is a beneficiary of Jennie's estate. Mr. Faulkner's
attorney prepared an instrument entitled "Renunciation of Interest," purporting to comply
with Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-80] Although the recites o\ the Renunciation o* n.iea^:
state that Mi Pa;t llknei "desires to rei lounce and re; •::.:'.

111 ight, tit]

i^u: : " ••

as a beneficiary of the estate or trust of Jennie A. Faulkner, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§75-2-801," in the operative provisions of the Renunciation, Mr. Faulkner did not
renounce his interest as a beneficiary of the 1 rust

R athei , the renunciation stated:

"Now therefore, in consideration oi the foregoing, ai id pi irs i lant to [ Jtali Code - \ iin §' ) 5 2
801,1. I -awrence C. 1 <ai llknei , hereby renounce, relinquish, and otherwise forfeit all my
right, title, interest, or ciami as a beneficiary of tb - ^ u t e of Jennie A. Faulkner as
though I had predeceased her." (Emphasis added).
The language of the disclaimer which was drafted by Mr. Faulkner's attorney,
disclaims only ;.;. /aulkner's interest as a beneficiary of the estate of Jennie "\ Fai ilia tei ,
not Mr. Faulknei 's interest in tl le Tr i ist

If I ? aulkner w ei e before the :oi irt seeking a
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distribution from the Trust, he could point to the language of his Renunciation and take
the position that he disclaimed only his interest as a beneficiary of the estate, and was
therefore, entitled to take under the Trust. The disclaimer statute, Utah Code Annotated
§75-2-801 requires that the disclaimer "describe the property or interest disclaimed," and
that the disclaimer "declare the disclaimer and extent thereof." U.C.A.§75-2-80 l(3)(a)
and (b). The specific language of the disclaimer signed by Faulkner described only
Faulkner's interest as a beneficiary of the estate, not the Trust, and declares that he
disclaims all his right, title, interest or claim as a beneficiary of the estate of Jenny A.
Faulkner, but does not disclaim any interest in the Trust. Therefore, the purported
Renunciation as executed by Faulkner is not an effective disclaimer of his interest as a
beneficiary of the Trust under U.C.A. §75-2-801.
Because the proceeds from the sale of the home were Trust assets, Faulkner did
not properly disclaim them and the $29,243.64 in Renee Faulkner's possession at the time
she was served with a Writ of Garnishment properly belonged to Larry Faulkner, and
were subject to garnishment.
2.

Faulkner's Attempted Disclaimer Was Barred by His Prior
Acceptance of Property He Sought to Disclaim.

Regardless of whether Mr. Faulkner's disclaimer was valid to disclaim Faulkner's
interest in the Trust on its face, however, the Trial Court properly determined that the
disclaimer was barred by Mr. Faulkner's prior acceptance of Trust Property. Mr.
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Faulkner repeatedly states in his brief that he executed a valid, timely and effective
disclaimer. While it is undisputed that Mr. Faulkner attempted to execute a disclaimer
under Utah law ,-i, .\iu\ -

.t.e issue as to whether IV li Faulknei ' s purpoi ted

disclaimer w as effective is a question of ' ' " j i 1 |;: >t ^ ^ determined in tl le nega ti\ e b) the
Trial Court. In re Rohn 's Estate, 175 N.W .2d 419 (Iowa 1970) (effectiveness of
renunciation is a question of fact; and 96 CJ.S,} Wills §1714, In this case, Judge Stanton
Taylor determined that Mr. Faulkner's disclaimer was ij^-;k\.n\ e ana i^arrea IOI sevei al
reasons.
A

>i* i; L-aulkner Accepted Property from I ho "'II"i""ili I 1 rior
r ^ touting his General Disclaimer.

The trial court determined that La;. \ Faulkner accepted property and/or benefits
from IbcTru^L |R.X( ' -

If/ , s .S77//V,

• :;

citing In re O'Byrne's Wiu, 1-T2 I \ A . S . 2 Q 45b ^ur. LA. ^iij.

A question of fact is

something that entails "the empirical, such as things, events, actions, or conditions
happening, existing, or taking place." State v. / ; c\i. N(v

..;

:_

/.; f: i ^ ,

i

he

question of w hether I\ Ir. Fai xlkner accepted personal pi opert) fron I the I rust is a question
of fact that was answered affirmatively by the Trial Court.

3

The Renunciation executed by Mr. Faulkner was dated April 4. 2!iu . aik M;
Faulkner incorrectly identified its date as April 4, 2000 in his opening brief, b ;! there is no
dispute that Mr. Faulkner actually signed the Disclaimer on May 4, 2001 \ R 4. 2 \
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The Appellant argues in Footnote 6 of the Appellant's Brief that there was
"significant evidence . . .that Faulkner did not accept any items of personalty." Thus,
Appellant challenges a finding of fact. However, when challenging a factual finding, the
Appellant is required to marshal the evidence in support of the court's finding, and ferret
out the fatal flaw in the court's reasoning. Moon v. Moon, 973 R2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct.
App. 1999) (quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991). If an Appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate Court must
accept the trial court's findings as true. Valcare v. Fitzgerald, 961 R2d 305, 312 (Utah
1998); and Young v. Young, 979 R2d 338, 345 (Utah 1999). Faulkner fails to marshal the
evidence to support the trial court's finding that Faulkner's actions constituted the type of
acceptance that precludes his general disclaimer. Thus, this court must accept the
findings of the Trial Court as true. There can be no dispute in this appeal that Faulkner
accepted property from the Trust.
Appellant also argues that Faulkner's acceptance of personal property from the
Trust "does not amount to acceptance which would vitiate a disclaimer." (Appellant's
Brief, p. 19). Under Utah Code Annotated Section 75-2-801 a disclaimer is barred by the
acceptance of property sought to be disclaimed. U.C.A. §75-2-801(5).

Appellant argues

that the question of whether the acceptance amounts to one which would vitiate a
disclaimer as a question of statutory interpretation, or a question of law. In fact, however,
under Utah law the issue is a mixed question of fact and law. As the Georgia Supreme
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Court pointed out in Jordan v. Trowei , 431 S.E.2d 160, 162 (Ga.Ct.App. 1993), the finder
of fact is authorized to determine whether the actions of the disclaimant constitute the
kind of acceptance or possession of the pi opei I;; of the estate that \ v o uldprecl i ide the

wholly consistent with the standards of review as set forth by this court in State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
In Pena, this Court stated that when a trial court is asked to determine "whether a
given set of % ^ comes \\it; ; r the read*. ; .; r.w; i;u . . :.,.\
: • , r- da: .

• ':

t

, t; ;, jourt is given a

' ' ••! . v Hate coui I: has

determined that a particular fact situation does or does not satisfy the legal standard at
issue, the trial court lias discretio i. venture into that area and make that determination.
State v. Pena, So^ \\\ ,. J, 939-4U i
this case is "I Jta

•

..*!. .

^ hw sought to be applied in
!

•

. -' /

. . ^ *:K

the property or interest" bars the right to disclaim property or interest. The trial court has
determined that Faulkner accepted Trust property. The determination of whether such
acceptance bars the right to disclaim requires the trial court to apply the code section to
the facts

fhis is a mixed questic n of lav • and fact that w arrants gi anting the tria 1 coi u I:

discretion in making its determination. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 R2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998).
In this case, the Trial Court determined that Larry Faulkner's actions constituted
the kind of acceptance of the property of the estate the precluded him from making a
19
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general renunciation of his interest in the Trust. (R. 869). The trial court was in a unique
position to review the evidence and determine that Mr. Faulkner's actions manifested an
intent to accept the benefits of the Trust such that his later general disclaimer was barred.
This was a discretionary finding that should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard.

See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998).

Regardless, however, of whether the Trial Court is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion or correction of error standard, the Trial Court did not err in interpreting Utah
Code §75-2-801. In order to determine whether Mr. Faulkner's acceptance of property
from the Trust, bars his disclaimer, the court properly looked at the language of Mr.
Faulkner's disclaimer, as well as the language of the statute. The statute requires that the
disclaimer shall "describe the property or interest disclaimed," and "declare the
disclaimer and extent thereof." U.C.A.. §75-2-801(3). Mr. Faulkner executed a
disclaimer that identified the interest to be disclaimed, namely his right, title, interest or
claim as a beneficiary of the estate of Jennie A. Faulkner. Faulkner further declared the
extent of his disclaimer when he stated that he disclaimed all his right, title, interest or
claim as a beneficiary of the estate of Jennie A. Faulkner. To determine whether Mr.
Faulkner's acceptance of property from the trust bars his general disclaimer, the Utah
Trial court did what nearly every court cited in Appellant's brief did: it looked at the
language of the disclaimer and asked whether the disclaimant had accepted any property
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covered by the disclaimer. Because the Trial Court determined there was an acceptance
of property sought to be disclaimed, the disclaimer was barred.
Similarly, in nearly every case cited by Faulkner, the Courts looked at the language
oi W\c disclaimer and asked if the disclaii nants had takei i at ij of the pi opert> son i ght tc be
disclaimed If the Coi u ts detei n lined that the disclaimants had taken property sought to
be disclaimed, the disclaimers were barred. Specifically, Faulkner cite^ ihi^ t ouri ;»•First Nat 7 Bank of Houston v. Toombs, 431 S.W.2d 404, W(TQX

CW

\PV

- ^

Toombs the disclaimants were left two gilts undei ;i w ill

-.- * , v. ,K .

interest in pasmiul effects, and the MIIKM was JII IIII nine inli

' n a trust. ' Hie

:

n

'

" ••

disclaimants took the cash and personal effects under the Will and attempted to disclaim
"any benefits under the trust." The Toombs court looked at the language of the disclaimer
and determined that the disclaimers were partial renunciations ol the ii ust interests.

,-

Because the disclaii nants had taken cash and pei sonal effects from the Will, bi it had not
accepted property from the Trust which they specifically sought to disclaim, the
disclaimer was valid and not barred. The Toombs Court took the same approach that the
Utah Court took o\ looking at the language of the disclaimer and determining

iicm: *

proper!s swu^hl In he diselmmed h.td aln <ich been accepted In litunibs, the disclaimers
on their face purported only to disclaim the disclaimants' interests in the Trust, and did
not purport to disclaim property that had already been accepted. Therefore, the
disclaimers were valid.
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Faulkner also cites this court to Badouh v. Hale, 22 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 2000). The
Badouh case is also consistent with Whitney's position in this case. In Badouh, the court
took the position that the disclaimant's disclaimer as to her entire interest in the estate
was barred by her exercise of dominion and control (acceptance) of property belonging to
the estate. Similarly in this case Faulkner attempted to disclaim his entire interest in the
estate. His acceptance of property from the Trust bars such a disclaimer. Faulkner argues
that because he only accepted items under one provision of the Trust, he was entitled to
renounce property that passed to him under another provision of the Trust. Because Utah
statutes permit partial disclaimers, Faulkner would have been entitled to accept some of
the benefits of the trust and disclaim others. However, as discussed below, in order to
effectuate such a partial disclaimer, Faulkner was required to describe the partial interest
to be disclaimed, and declare the extent of the partial disclaimer. This he did not do.
Rather, Faulkner executed a general disclaimer of all his right, title and interest in the
Trust when he had already accepted property from the Trust. Thus under U.C.A. §75-2801(5), and the reasoning of Badouh, Faulkner was barred from executing a general
disclaimer.

•

<

Faulkner next cites Bank ofDelaware v. Smith, 211 A.2d 591 (Del. Ch. 1965). In
the Bank ofDelaware case, the language of the disclaimer renounced the disclaimant's
right, title and interest in the income of the trust. The court looked at the language of the
disclaimer, asked whether the disclaimant had already taken income from the trust,
I
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determined that the disclaimant had taken income from the trust, and held that the
disclaimer was barred.
Faulkner also cites this court to In Re Estate ofGoldammer, 405 N.V* .!-•*'

;

°

Ct. A pp. 1987) w liich held that in the absence of a specific statutoi y hi u , a disclaimer
.-

n ••

.

•

v\, - this case is supportive of the

position taken by Whitney. Whitney's position is that the disclaimer should be enforced
according to its terms. The language of the disclaimer purports to disclaim all Faulkner's
interest in the ' I i i ist, but the I rial Court determined that I; a ulkner had already accepte :i
property i inder the ' I i ust w hich barred h is disclaimer undei 1 Jtah Code \ nnotated §75-2801(5). Therefore, looking at the specific terms of the disclaimer, Utah has a statutory
bar to the execution of such disclaimer.
Finally, Faulkner cites Jordan v Tm\vct\4V. S.E 2d 160 (Ga.Ct. App 1993). In
Jordan the court found that the disclaimant manifested an intention to disclaim, aiui i;ie

anion int to an acceptance of property sought to be disclaimed. The Court determined
under those facts that the disclaimer was valid.
The only case cited by Faulkner in support of his position that his general
disclaimer should not be invalidated in whole b> •* unic

:

;r :aci :h,ii he accepted some

of the ' I 'rust propei ty covered by 0 le disdain ler is In re Womble, 289 B R 836 (N.D.
Texas, 2003) In Womble, the Bankruptc> Court determined that under Texas Probate
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law, Womble's acceptance of property prior to execution of the disclaimer did not
invalidate the disclaimer as a whole. While the case appears to be on point, it is
distinguishable from the case at bar. First, the Texas statute does not require that the
extent of the disclaimer be declared as the Utah disclaimer statute does. Moreover, the
Texas Bankruptcy Court's decision is anomalous with the other legal decisions rendered
by Texas Courts, and the legal trends identified in the other cases cited herein. In
Womble, the Bankruptcy Court looked at the language of the disclaimer, asked whether
property subject to the disclaimer had been accepted, determined that it had, and still
upheld the disclaimer as to the property that was not previously accepted. This is not the
approach taken by the Texas Civil Appellate Court in First City Nat 7 Bank of Houston v.
Toombs, 431 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); or the Texas Supreme Court in Badouh
v. Hale, 22 S.W.2d 392 (Texas 2000).
Further, the Bankruptcy Court's position is contrary to the dicta of the 8th Circuit
Court in In re Popkin & Stern, 223 F.3d 764, 767 (8th Cir. 2000). In Popkin, the parties
were disputing exactly such an issue: "whether acceptance of any part of the property
covered by a disclaimer render the entire [General] disclaimer invalid as to all other
property covered by it but not accepted." The 8th Circuit stated that because they had a
second, more narrow Real Property Disclaimer to look to they did not need to answer that
question. The 8th Circuit stated however, that even if they "were inclined to agree that the
General Disclaimer-which broadly disclaims "any interest" in the [trust and estate]-is
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unenforceable because [the disclaimant] accepted certain property disclaimed under it,"
they were "still left with the second, narrower disclaimer.

.i'c:.)pi.>

Yt , , : . ( • • • .

A V .". 1

< 'is -Ii'.imer was

\ alid. the 8th Ch ci lit si .ated that not only was the Real Property Disclaimer (the specific
disclaimer) prima facie valid, but it was "not rendered void by the disclaimant's
acceptance of property covered by it," L /. rherefore, while the Sl!l I'naiit declined t>
answer the specific issue iinulwd in Ihis case, 11 n • * omi s dicta and approach air
consistent w ilh the pi op* >sil u ':- •• general disclaimer will be rendered void by the
acceptance of property covered by it. This position is further supported by 96 CIS,
Wills §1711 which provides:
Even though a general disclaimer may be invalid, where the beneficiary has
accepted certain personal property disclaimed under it, a more narrow real property
disclaimer filed subsequently, is valid where the beneficiary never took title or
possession of such real property.
96 CIS., Wills §1711, citing Jw re Popkin v. Stern, 223 R3d 764, 76 7 (8th Cii 2000).
The frial Court, applying Utah Code §75-2-801 to facts of this case, determined
that Faulkner's general disclaimer was statuloi ily barinl h •' Ins pi 101 acceptance of
property covered by the genera! disclaimer. This conclusion is supported by the evidence,
consistent with the plain terms of the statute, and consistent with the approach taken by
the majority of courts. The trial court did not err or ah'ise its discretion in reaching such
conclusion, The decision of the trial court sho.^w IK .. r*: eri.
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B.

Utah Code Permits Partial Disclaimers, But Faulkner Did
Not Execute a Partial Disclaimer in this Case.

Appellant correctly points out that Utah's Disclaimer Statute permits disclaimers
"in whole or in part." Utah Code Ann. §75-2-801. However, Utah Code Ann. §75-2801(3), as indicated above, provides that the disclaimer shall "describe the property or
interest disclaimed," and "declare the disclaimer and extent thereof." Further, as
discussed above, examination of the contents of Mr. Faulkner's disclaimer, and
determination as to whether the disclaimer is sufficient is a question of fact. 96 C.J.S.,
Wills, §1714, citing In re Rohn 's Estate, 175 N.W.2d 419 (Iowa 1970).
By statute, Mr. Faulkner was required to describe the property or interest
disclaimed. U.C.A.§75-2-801(3)(a). In the recitals of his disclaimer, Mr. Faulkner states
that he is a beneficiary of the Trust of Jennie A. Faulkner, and that he "desires to
renounce and relinquish all right, title, interest, or claim as a beneficiary of the estate or
trust of Jennie A. Faulkner." Mr. Faulkner was then required, by the statute, to "declare
the disclaimer and extent thereof." U.C.A.§75-2-80l(3)(b) (Emphasis added). Mr.
Faulkner declared his disclaimer as follows:
"I, Lawrence C. Faulkner, hereby renounce, relinquish, and otherwise forfeit all
my right, title, interest or claim as a beneficiary of the estate of Jennie A.
Faulkner."4 (Emphasis added).

4

The issue of the effectiveness of the Disclaimer on its face will be discussed below
in Section B.
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While Utah law permits fractional or partial disclaimers, the Court looked at the language
of Mr. Faulkner's attempted renunciation, and determined that Mr. Faulkner's attempted
Renunciation was inn a distlainiei ul a pailial m li.irlioiiiil interest theieof" (K K6l)l
Beeausa (In; ulisi

LIIIIHT

nas unit a partial disclaimer, but rather was a disclaimer of all his

right, title and interest in the estate of Jennie Faulkner, Faulkner's disclaimer of all his
interest was statutorily barred by his prior acceptance of some of the Trust Property,
pursuant^, taf K ode \\\n. Section o - J KOthHa).
Faulkner attempts to gloss over the fact that his disclaimer was a general
disalaiinet by staling thai (ha alkm huilhirr inlendind hi disclaim was an interest in Ilia
sales proceeds of the real estate, or the residuum of the Trust. If Faulkner, in fact,
intended to disclaim an interest in the sales proceeds of the real estate, or the residuum of
the Trust, he very easily could have drafted his disclaimer \^ iiiai e:ie.

< r.ai :

v,

:

happened.
The '1 rial ("oiul dctciininexl lhal w llule pailai! tJisn lanneis aie pamiitled! III "
language of i hali i ode Ann "union 7v^-8oi requires that the disclaimer of a partial
interest must describe the partial interest sought to be disclaimed, and must declare the
extent of the disclaimer. This is the plain language of the statute, and this is not what
Faulknci di "! " ' '

"

'uded that it w 01 ilcii i/OtreA * rite Faul kner' 's disclaimer I: : sa >

5

Although this finding was labeled a conclusion of law, It is actually a finding of fact
and the appellate courts will disregard labels on factual findings and conclusions of law and
look to substance. Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d JT4-5 <TTtah 1QO?\
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something it did not say. Faulkner argues that the disclaimer statute should be construed
liberally such that substantial compliance with the statute should suffice. Faulkner states
he should only be required to substantially comply with the disclaimer statute because no
prejudice results to Whitney. This, however, is not the point. In fact, Faulkner arguably
has complied with the statute in that he described the property sought to be disclaimed
and declared the extent of the disclaimer, so it is not a matter of substantial or strict
compliance with the statute. Rather, Faulkner's disclaimer, as written, is a general
disclaimer that is statutorily barred by his prior acceptance of Trust property. If this Court
were to hold that Faulkner is permitted to disclaim a partial interest in the Trust without
describing that "partial" interest and the "partial" extent of the disclaimer, the Court
would be disregarding the requirement of 75-2-80l(3)(a) and (b). This, the Court is not
permitted to do. "In interpreting a statute, courts should avoid adding to or deleting from
statutory language, unless absolutely necessary to "make it a rational statute/' Luckau v.
Board of Review, 840 R2d 811, 815 (Utah Ct App. 1992), citing 2 A Norman J. Singer,
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.38 (5th ed. 1992); see Resolution Trust Corp. v.
Lightfoot, 938 R2d 65, 66-67 (7th Cir. 1991).
The Trial Court properly determined that the language of Faulkner's disclaimer
was not a disclaimer of a partial or fractional interest, and thus his prior acceptance of
property covered by the disclaimer barred his general disclaimer. The decision of the
Trial Court should be upheld.
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C.

Court Did Not Rule that One Could Not Disclaim in Favor
of One's Wife.

Faulkner inaccurately states that the Trial Court "also concluded that because the
primary beneficiary of Faulkner's disclaimer was his wife, Renee, he could not disclaim
in a way that favored her." (Appellant's Brief, p. 36). The court did not make any
determination that Faulkner could not disclaim to his wife. Rather the court determined
that in addition to Faulkner accepting property directly from the trust and estate, he also
received a benefit from property of the Trust. It is undisputed that Larry Faulkner is
wholly supported by his wife. Renee Faulkner pays for Larry Faulkner's care, the home
in which he resides, his gas, his clothing and his credit cards. (R. 863). It is further
undisputed that many of the items of personal property that belonged to his mother are
now found in Larry Faulkner's home and are being used by him and his wife. (R. 864).
Larry and Renee Faulkner in their Motion to Quash the Writ of Garnishment, initially
took the position that Larry Faulkner had not taken any items of property from the Trust
or estate, and that it was his wife who had taken possession of the property. (R. 315). In
response to this, Whitney's position was that even if it were true that Faulkner had taken
no property from the Trusj, he was enjoying the benefit of that property by virtue of the
fact that the property was in his home, subject to his use and enjoyment. Further, any
money that was distributed to Ms. Faulkner was similarly available to Larry Faulkner. Of
course, after discovery, thfe evidence showed that Larry Faulkner had, in fact, taken
possession of several items of property from the Trust. The Trial court merely agreed that
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in addition to taking actual possession of items from the Trust, Mr. Faulkner had also
received a benefit from the trust property. The Court determined that the property his
wife received from the Trust were available to him for his beneficial use.
Utah Code Annotated §75-2-801(5) provides that one who accepts property or a
benefit therefrom is barred from disclaiming the property. The court found that Larry
Faulkner had received a benefit from the Trust property and was thus barred from
disclaiming his full interest in the Trust as he had attempted to do. This too is a finding
of fact, and because Faulkner has failed to marshal the evidence in support of that
finding, and then ferret out the fatal flaw, the finding must be affirmed by this court.
Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (quoting West Valley City v.
Majesticlnv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Moreover, even if this court determines that the Trial Court's finding that Faulkner
accepted benefits from the Trust was in error, it was an alternate finding and is harmless
error under Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON THE GARNISHMENT AMOUNT.

After a hearing on this matter, the Trial Court ruled that Faulkner's disclaimer was
ineffective and barred so that the $29,243.64 held by Renee Faulkner was properly the
property of Mr. Faulkner, subject to the Writ of Garnishment served by Whitney on May
10, 2001. The issue is whether Whitney is entitled to prejudgment interest on the
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garnished amount from May 10, 2001 (date Writ was served) through May 9, 2002 (date
of Court's final judgment).
Utah Code Annotated Section 15-1-1 governs the rate of prejudgment interest, and
provides that:
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for the loan
or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the subject of their
contract.
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the legal
rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action
shall be 10% per annum. (Emphasis added).
The Garnishment is a chose in action subject to prejudgment interest under U.C.A.
§15-1-1. In Wasatch Mining Co. v. Crescent Mining Co., 7 Utah 8, 24 P. 586 (1890),
aff d, 151 U.S. 317, 14 S. Ct. 348, 38 L. Ed. 177 (1894), the Utah Supreme Court found,
and the United States Supreme Court affirmed, that in Utah, interest is allowed on debts
overdue, even in absence of statute or contract providing therefor.
The trial court determined in a post hearing telephone conference on April 19,
2002, that Whitney was not entitled to prejudgment interest. The question of whether a
plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest is a question of law reviewed for correctness.
Klinger v. Kightly, 889 R2d 1372, 1381 (Utah Ct. App.1995); Andreason v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 848 R2d 171, 177 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Ms. Faulkner owed Mr. Faulkner, and
thus Mr. Whitney, $29,243.64, when the Writ of Garnishment was served upon her. "In

31
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah, prejudgment interest may be awarded in situations where the damages is complete,
the loss can be measured by facts and figures, and the amount of the loss is fixed as of a
particular time." Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171 (Utah Ct.App. 1993).
"Prejudgment interest represents an amount awarded as damages due to the defendants'
delay in tendering an amount clearly owing under an agreement or other obligation.
Baker v. Dataphase, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 724 (D. Utah 1992) citing L &ADrywallf Inc. v.
Whitmore Constr. Co., 608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980), and Vasels v. Lo Guidice, 740
P.2d 1375, 1378 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
In this case, the only issue was whether the money in Ms. Faulkner's possession on
May 10, 2001, had been properly disclaimed by Larry Faulkner when Renee Faulkner was
served with a Writ of Garnishment. If the disclaimer was invalid, Renee Faulkner was in
possession of monies belonging to Larry Faulkner, and had an "obligation" to pay those
monies to Whitney. Ms. Faulkner took the position that she was not in possession of any
such monies, and months of litigation ensued. The trial court ultimately determined that
Ms. Faulkner's position was erroneous and that the Writ of Garnishment served upon her
created an obligation requiring her to pay Larry Faulkner's $29,243.64 in her possession
to Mr. Whitney.
Under Rule 64D(i) if the Answers to Garnishee's Interrogatories are challenged
and the court determines that the Garnishee's Answers were incorrect, "judgment shall be
entered upon the verdict or finding the same as if the garnishee had answered according
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to such verdict or finding." URCP 64D(i). In this case, the court determined that at the
time the writ was served on May 10, 2001, Renee Faulkner had in her possession
$29,243.64 that rightfully belonged to Larry Faulkner. The judgment was entered the
same as if Ms. Faulkner had answered that she was indebted to Larry Faulkner in the
amount of $29,243.64 as of May 10, 2001. "The law is clear that respondent is entitled to
prejudgment interest on this overdue debt from that date until entry of judgment."
Fitzgerald v. Critchfield,144 R2d 301, 304 (Utah Ct.App. 1987), citing Bjork v. April
Indus., Inc., 560 R2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 930, 97 S. Ct. 2634, 53
L. Ed. 2d 245 (1977); L & A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Constr. Co., 608 R2d 626, 629
(Utah 1980). The Court in Fitzgerald held that "the interest issue is injected by law into
every action for the payment of past due money." Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 R2d at
304 (Utah CtApp. 1987) quoting Lignell v. Berg, 593 R2d 800, 809 (Utah 1979).
There is no question that the damages were complete and the amount of damages
was never in question. When the court determined that Faulkner's disclaimer was invalid
and barred, the amount subject to the Writ of Garnishment was Larry Faulkner's one-half
interest in the residuum of the Jennie A. Faulkner Trust, or $29,243.64. Similarly, there
was no question as to the "particular time of the loss." The money was subject to
Garnishment on the date that the Writ of Garnishment was served, May 10, 2001.
Therefore, the judgment amount should include the $29,243.64 plus prejudgment interest
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from May 10, 2001 through date of judgment for damages due to Faulkner's delay in
tendering the amount due under the Writ of Garnishment.
To put this another way, Renee Faulkner was indebted to Larry Faulkner in the
amount of $29,243.64 on May 10, 2001, when the Writ of Garnishment was served. If
Larry Faulkner had demanded payment as of that date and Mrs. Faulkner had refused tp
make payment, Mr. Faulkner would have been entitled to prejudgment interest pursuant to
Utah Code and case law as cited above. Likewise, Mr. Whitney, as the Garnishment
Plaintiff, is entitled to prejudgment interest on the amount which was owed to Larry
Faulkner and subject to the Writ of Garnishment, but which Renee Faulkner failed and
refused to deliver pursuant to the Writ of Garnishment.
Finally, prejudgment should be awarded pursuant to Utah law as a disincentive for
Garnishees to unlawfully withhold monies that are otherwise subject to garnishment. The
trial court erred in failing to award prejudgment interest on the $29,243.64 from May 10,
2001 through the date of judgment, and the Garnishee Defendant, Renee Faulkner should
be ordered to pay prejudgment interest.
VI.

CONCLUSION
The trial court properly determined that Larry Faulkner's Renunciation was invalid

and barred by Faulkner's acceptance of property covered by the disclaimer. The trial
court's decision should be affirmed. With regard to the prejudgment interest issue,
however, the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to award prejudgment interest
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on the garnished amount as of the date of service of the writ of garnishment. The trial
court's ruling prejudgment interest should be reversed as a matter of law.
Respectfully submitted this D day of July 2003.
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC
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Attorneys for Appellee and Cross Appellant,
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